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Two hundred years ago, the Monthly Magazine’s “Retrospect of German 
Literature” brought its readers news of the latest philosophical developments: Schelling’s 
star was rising, while the “venerable Kant,” now in his eighties, “vegetates in retirement 
from the scene of action” (Vol. XV:I [1803]  667-8). Though Kant’s philosophy had been 
attacked only a few years earlier in the pages of the Anti-Jacobin Review as “extremely 
dangerous” (V [Jan-April 1800] 339-47), it now appeared that it was well on the way to 
becoming passé. Indeed, even those who had been appalled by it were beginning to 
wonder whether it was anything more than a passing fancy. An 1801 letter to the editor of 
the Anti-Jacobin Review concluded, “I always was of the opinion that that ephemeron, 
Kant’s Philosophy, would not outlive its author and be forgotten, when Bacon, Newton, 
Leibniz, &c. will continue to stand the test of ages” (VII [Sept-Jan. 1801] 507-8). 
The rumors of the demise of Kant’s philosophy were, of course, greatly 
exaggerated and, two centuries later, there are few eighteenth-century thinkers whose 
impact on the way in which philosophy is conducted rivals that of Kant. The major 
tendencies in continental philosophy, from Heidegger to Foucault, from the critical 
theory of the Frankfurt School to Karl Popper’s critical rationalism have all been 
decisively shaped by encounters with Kant. Much present-day moral and political 
philosophy is inconceivable without Kant, thanks in large part to the impact of the work 
of John Rawls and those influenced by his work. Commentaries on Kant’s works and 
explorations of the implications of these works have proliferated to the point where it has 
long been impossible for anyone to keep up with them. Kant has become so much our 
contemporary that it is sometimes easy to forget that he belongs to the eighteenth-century 
— indeed, there are a number of lines of Kant interpretation which have attempted, with 
varying degrees of success, to do just that. The translations and studies under review here 
suggest some of the ways in which attempts have been made to reconnect Kant to his 
century and, in the process, to see his work from a somewhat different perspective. 
 
*** 
From almost the start, Kant has been rather well-served by translators. In 1798, 
the indefatigable John Richardson, a Scot who pursued studies with Kant’s disciples J. S. 
Beck and L. H. Jakob towards the end of the 1790s, produced a two-volume edition of 
Kant’s Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political, Religious, and Various Philosophical 
Subjects (London: William Richardson, 1798) that included the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Observations on the 
Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Perpetual Peace, along with fifteen other of 
Kant’s essays on moral philosophy, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of religion, 
and natural history. He subsequently published a translation of Kant’s Logic in 1819 and 
a collection entitled The Metaphysical Works of the Celebrated Immanuel Kant. A steady 
stream of translations followed, and today most of Kant’s major works are available in 
multiple translations. 
A decade ago Cambridge University Press began a projected fifteen-volume 
edition of Kant’s works in English, under the general editorship of Paul Guyer and Allen 
Wood. The goal of series, as explained in the short “General editors’ preface” that begins 
every volume, is to make generally available a complete English translation of Kant’s 
works (including such previously untranslated texts as transcripts of his lectures along 
with his marginalia, notes, and correspondence) in “comprehensive volumes organized 
both chronologically and topically” with a consistent translation of crucial technical 
terms. On the basis of the volumes that have appeared to date, these goals have, for the 
most part, been met. The rationale behind the assignment of some of Kant’s shorter 
essays to the different volumes may, in some cases, be a bit puzzling, particularly the 
distinction between the Practical Philosophy volume (which contains, among other 
essays, Kant’s famous answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?”,  his essay on 
“The Common Saying: that may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice,” and 
“Toward Perpetual Peace”) and the forthcoming volume on Anthropology, History, and 
Education (which, apparently, will contain Kant’s other essays on historical questions). 
Readers searching for Kant’s important essay on the public use of reason, “What is 
Orientation in Thinking?” will, however, search of it in vain in these two volumes: it 
resides, instead, in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology.  
According to the “General editors’ preface,” the rationale behind the organization 
of the volumes topically was, to “facilitate the serious study of his philosophy by 
English-speaking philosophers.” There is certainly an attraction in having available for 
classroom use a collection like the Practical Philosophy volume, which places in 
students’ hands faithful and consistent translations of the Groundwork, the Critique of 
Practical Reason, and The Metaphysics of Morals, along with such minor masterpieces as 
the essay on “Theory and Practice” and the uncompromising “On a supposed right to lie 
from philanthropy” — an essay which, if nothing else, confirms every student’s worst 
fears about what Kant’s moral philosophy entails (“You mean, if a Nazi comes to the 
door and asks if I am hiding Jews upstairs, the categorical imperative requires that I tell 
the truth?!?”). But, as Allen Wood makes abundantly clear is his succinct and lucid 
introduction to the volume, for a clarification of some of the murkier parts of the 
Groundwork readers would be well-advised to consult Religion within the Limits of 
Reason Alone — which drives home the point that not all of Kant’s moral philosophy is 
to be found within the six-hundred some pages of Practical Philosophy. A “serious 
study” of Kant’s moral philosophy will require forays into the Religion and Rational 
Theology volume and, when it becomes available, the Anthropology, History, and 
Education volume. 
This is, of course, a minor complaint and it is more than compensated for by the 
quality of the volumes. Each contains a short introduction and extended editorial end 
notes. In the cases of volumes compromised of a number of works individual works are 
preceded by editorial head notes sketching the history of the text. Footnotes provide 
(sparingly) the German terms or phrases in cases where it would be helpful to know 
them. Readers lacking Latin will find the Latin terms which Kant frequently employs 
translated at the bottom of the page as well and the translation of the Critique of Pure 
Reason provides, for the first time, a translation of Kant’s marginalia from his own copy 
of the work. With the exception of the Correspondence volume (which has only an index 
of persons) all volumes come with indexes of both persons and subjects (sometimes 
merged, but more frequently separated). The quality of the subject indexes is, in general, 
quite good. The best designed are those in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, Lectures on Metaphysics, and (happily) the Critique of Pure 
Reason, a work which greatly profits from having one. The volumes devoted to Kant’s 
Correspondence, Lectures on Ethics and Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 include 
helpful biographical sketches of the various individuals with whom Kant corresponded or 
whom he discussed in his writings. The margins of all but one of the volumes contain 
volume and page references to the Prussian Academy edition of Kant’s works, the 
standard citation source in the secondary literature on Kant. The exception is the Critique 
of Pure Reason, which follows the long-established custom of providing the page 
references for the “A” (1781) and “B” (1787) editions. The cloth editions are expensive, 
but beautifully produced. No serious academic library can afford to be without them. The 
prices of the paper editions are reasonable enough to make them good choices for 
classroom use. Not only will students learn something about Kant; they will also see what 
goes into the making of a serious scholarly edition. 
A brief tour of the individual volumes may be suggest the wealth of material that 
has been assembled. Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 offers the most comprehensive 
collection in English of works from the period prior to the publication of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. The best-known works included in this volume are “The Only Possible 
Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God” from 1763,  “Inquiry 
Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality,” his 
1764 contribution to the question posed by the Berlin Academy of Sciences (for which 
Kant received an honorable mention, while Moses Mendelssohn received first prize), his 
1770 Inaugural Dissertation, and Dreams of Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of 
Metaphysics, a remarkable work from 1766 in which Kant contrasted Swedenborg’s 
writings to those of metaphysicians and produced a complex and ironic essay that left 
Moses Mendelssohn wondering whether Kant was attempting to make “metaphysics 
laughable or spirit-seeing believable” [Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek  IV:2 (1767)] and 
led Herder to praise Kant’s style as the equal to Sterne’s [Königsbergische Gelehrte und 
Politische Zeitung (March 3, 1766)]. The Practical Philosophy volume contains, in 
addition to Kant’s three central texts on ethics — the 1785 Groundwork, the 1788 
Critique of Practical Reason, and the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals — a number of 
smaller essays, ranging from a 1783 review of a work by the notorious Johann Heinrich 
Schulz (an unorthodox clergyman whose Spinozist tendencies led to his prosecution 
during the counter-enlightenment of the 1780s and whose cultivation of an 
unconventional style of dress earned him the nickname “Ponytail Schulz”) to a couple of 
essays on book publishing and the rights of authors. Unlike the Critique of Practical 
Reason, the volumes containing the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment (a title which the editors offer as a more accurate translation of the 
work that has been long known to English readers as the Critique of Judgment) do not 
include other material. The volume containing the Critique of the Power of Judgment 
does, however, include the long  — and subsequently deleted — first introduction to the 
work, perhaps Kant’s most important attempt to explain how his various works were 
supposed to fit together.  
The Cambridge Edition also includes a number of volumes containing material 
that has either never been available in English before or has been or that has been 
available only in part. The edition includes the first English translation of the Opus 
postumum, an enigmatic work begun by Kant in the 1790s, initially as an attempt to 
address certain issues having to do with the metaphysical foundations of the natural 
sciences. As Kant labored on the manuscript its scope expanded to include a moral and 
theological questions and, in certain passages, seems to adopt a conceptual vocabulary 
(e.g., his talk of “self-positing”) which resembles that of Fichte, whose approach he had 
rejected in a public declaration in 1799. Eckart Förster’s introduction recounts the 
vicissitudes of the manuscript, which was first published in full only in 1936 and 1938, 
and makes a case for the importance of the work, which was dismissed by Kant’s first 
editors as a product of his senility and excluded from early editions of his collected 
works. Given the state of the manuscript, any edition of the Opus postumum requires 
considerable editorial intervention and Förster’s introduction and notes clarify the 
assumptions that guided his edition of this puzzling work and provide a helpful 
orientation for readers making their way into this labyrinth for the first time.  
The series will include four volumes devoted to Kant’s lectures, drawing on notes 
taken by students in Kant’s courses at Königsberg. To date, the Lectures on Ethics, 
Lectures on Metaphysics, and Lectures on Logic have appeared, with a volume devoted 
to his important Lectures on Anthropology promised for the future. Faculty at Prussian 
universities were required to teach from textbooks and, in both his lectures on ethics and 
his lectures on metaphysics, Kant used works by Alexander Baumgarten as the basis for 
his courses. Around these textbooks he constructed lectures that were reported, as J. B. 
Schneewind notes in his introduction to the ethics volume, to be “witty, somewhat 
rambling, full of life and feeling, with scattered references to current events and to 
books” (Lectures on Ethics xix). While Kant discouraged note-taking in class, students 
seem to have taken them anyway (it is consoling, I suppose, to learn that Kant had no 
better luck in controlling what his students did in class than we do). Many of the notes 
that have come down to us seem, as Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon note in their 
introduction to the metaphysics lectures, to have been produced by poorer students who 
supported themselves by preparing compendia of notes from courses which were 
purchased by their wealthier classmates (see the fascinating discussion in Lectures on 
Metaphysics xxi-xxiii). These transcripts were recopied outside of class (a process which 
sometimes introduced errors into the text) and then revised in subsequent years to reflect 
changes in the material Kant presented. Copies of these notes seem to have circulated far 
beyond the immediate circle of Kant’s students and, as a result, eighteenth century 
admirers of Kant seem to have relied on a much wider range of sources than those that 
we tend to see as canonical today. 
A collection of material from Kant’s ethics lectures was edited by the German 
scholar Paul Menzer, published in 1924, and translated into English by Lewis Infield six 
years later. Infield’s translation has been reprinted a number of times (most recently, by 
Hackett Publishing). The version of these lectures in the Cambridge Edition, edited by 
Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind, follows more recent editorial conventions by keeping 
the different sets of student notes separate, rather than merging them into a single 
sequence of lectures. This is of particular importance in the case of the ethics lectures, 
since Kant lectured on the topic nearly thirty times and, over the course of the lectures, 
refined his own views on the topic. Four sets of notes are translated in this volume. The 
first set were transcribed by the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Herder, who studied with 
Kant between 1762-1764. The second set, dating from 1784, come from Georg Ludwig 
Collins and correspond, for the most part, to the materials published by Menzer, though 
Menzer himself seems to have based his edition on a different set of notes. The third set 
(attributed to Christian Coelestin Mrongovius) dates from 1784-1785 and contains Kant’s 
first presentation of the arguments advanced in the Groundwork. The final set of lectures 
notes, by the lawyer Johann Friedrich Vigilantius, dates from 1793-1794. They partly 
coincide with the material in the Collins notes from a decade earlier, but also contain 
some anticipations of Kant’s 1797 Metaphysics of Morals. While there are no real 
surprises in the lecture transcripts, they are helpful both in providing some insights 
(especially in the Herder notes) on the shape of Kant’s moral theory prior to the 
publication of the Groundwork and (in the Mrongovius notes) in revealing how Kant 
presented his own mature system to an audience of philosophical beginners. They are 
also helpful in revealing the extent to which Kant, on the lectern, emphasized themes 
which tend to be overlooked if attention is confined only to the published versions of his 
moral philosophy. One finds, in particular, a stress on the importance of the cultivation of 
moral character, a theme which plays an important role, as we shall see shortly, in the 
studies of Kant by Manfred Kuehn and Felicitas Munzel. 
The Lectures on Metaphysics have never been translated and, indeed, the edition 
prepared by Ameriks and Naragon corrects a number of errors that occurred in the 
transcription of these notes for the standard German edition of Kant’s works. Until 
recently, these lectures have tended to be ignored in the literature on Kant. They were a 
rather late addition to the German edition of his works, appearing in two volumes 
published in 1968 and 1970, and since the publication of those volumes additional sets of 
lecture notes have been discovered, providing what Ameriks and Naragon characterize as 
“the most striking addition to Kant literature in years.” Even more than in the case of the 
ethics lectures, the Lectures on Metaphysics revise the received view of Kant as — in 
Mendelssohn’s famous phrase — the “all-destroying” critic of metaphysics. In these 
lectures, Kant tells his students that metaphysics is “the spirit of philosophy,” and stands 
in relation to philosophy as the spiritus vini does to wine: it  “purifies our elementary 
concepts and thereby makes us capable of comprehending all sciences” and thus “is the 
greatest culture of the human understanding” (Lectures on Metaphysics 286). Kant 
followed the outline provided by Baumgarten, dividing his lectures into four sections — 
Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology (Empirical and Rational), and Theology —  with an 
opening Prolegomena. The text assembled by Ameriks and Naragon draws on eight sets 
of student notes (including notes by Herder, Mrongovius, and Vigilantius) and omits the 
material on Theology (lectures on this topic can be found in the Religion and Rational 
Theology volume). While there is a fair amount of repetition in the different lecture 
sequences, an elaborate editorial apparatus (in particular, a superb index) helps sort things 
out. The great virtue of these lectures is that it allows the reader to see how Kant related 
his approach to some of the traditional concerns of the earlier generation of German 
metaphysics, suggesting certain continuities which, as Ameriks emphasizes in his 
important study The Fate of Autonomy, tended to be lost in the first flush of 
interpretations of Kant’s critical philosophy. 
Arnulf Zweig’s edition of Kant’s Correspondence offers students of the 
eighteenth century a particularly rich collection of documents. Half of the letters in the 
collection are revised versions of the letters published in 1967 in Zweig’s well-known 
edition of Kant’s Philosophical Correspondence (University of Chicago Press). The other 
half appear for the first time, bringing the total number of letters in English to 216. The 
edition has much more to recommend it than simply the doubling the amount of Kant’s 
correspondence available in English. Zweig provides extensive endnotes, a compact 
introductory biography of Kant, and fifty pages of biographical information about Kant’s 
correspondents. These “Biographical Sketches” would alone make this volume worth 
acquiring and anyone working on eighteenth century German thought will be indebted to 
Zweig’s labors: there is no other biographical lexicon of this quality currently available in 
English. Zweig’s judicious selection of Kant’s letters makes for fascinating reading. His 
1967 collection already included the better-known letters on philosophical questions — 
for example, Kant’s correspondence with Johann Heinrich Lambert, Marcus Herz, Jacob 
Sigismund Beck, and Moses Mendelssohn (his correspondence with the latter includes a 
1783 letter in which Kant, desperately seeking a review of the Critique of Pure Reason 
from Mendelssohn, explains what Mendelssohn might discuss in a review — thus 
providing a unique guide to what Kant saw as important about the work). The new 
collection allows us to understand far better than before the intellectual, social, and 
political context in which Kant worked. It includes five more letters to Kant from the 
remarkable Johann Georg Hamann. It also makes available more of the correspondence 
between Kant and various representatives of the Berlin Enlightenment, providing a vivid 
picture of the anxieties prompted by Friedrich Wilhelm II’s campaign against the Berlin 
Enlightenment. As Zweig explains in his introduction, some of his choices are governed 
by the concerns of our own day: thus his interest in documenting Kant’s complex 
relationship with German Jews (4-5). The inclusion of a number of previously 
untranslated letters to and from female correspondents offers more documentation of 
Kant’s relationship with women, though some aspects of this relations with them — 
notably the 1762 letter from Maria Charlotta Jacobi with its coy expression of hope that, 
on Kant’s next visit, her “watch will get wound” (perhaps a ribald reference to Tristram 
Shandy?) — remain tantalizingly ambiguous. The result is a rich and multifaceted picture 
of Kant that will be required reading for anyone interested in Kant or the world in which 
he lived. 
 
*** 
Much the same may be said of Manfred Kuehn’s Kant: A Biography, the most 
comprehensive account of Kant’s life and work since Karl Vorländer’s two-volume study 
from 1924. Biographies of Kant have, as Kuehn notes in his “Prologue”, been relatively 
rare. The years after Kant’s death saw a flurry of anecdotal accounts which mostly served 
to fix in the public mind the image of Kant during his last decade: a man of fixed habits 
whose life was almost entirely devoted to thought. This picture has had a remarkable 
staying power. Ernst Cassirer’s 1918 study, translated into English two decades ago as 
Kant’s Life and Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), assumed that there 
was nothing that could be said about Kant’s life and remained content with a summary of 
his thought. 
As Kuehn notes, biographies of philosophers “are difficult to write” since 
“philosophers usually did not — and do not — live exciting lives” (19). The few 
exceptions — e.g., Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault — prove the rule: in 
these cases, it tends to be something other than philosophy that drives the biography. 
Nietzsche has his madness, Heidegger his Nazism, Wittgenstein his closet, and Foucault 
his sadomasochism. All Kant seems to offer biographers is his hypochondria, which is 
hardly a promising theme around which to weave an account of his life (though it has 
been attempted: see Hartmut and Gernot Böhme, Das Andere der Vernunft [Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1983]). It is little wonder, then, that Kuehn’s statement “Kant did have a life” 
(20) seems more than a bit defensive. Yet, in face of such seemingly unpromising 
material,  Kuehn succeeds in crafting a readable, indeed engrossing and often moving 
biography that combines an elegance of presentation with an impressive depth of 
scholarship. Kuehn has achieved what would seem to be the impossible: a book in which 
Kant’s life matters as much as his thought. Perhaps there is no more eloquent testimony 
to this than the book’s final chapter, a moving forty-page account of the slow decline of 
Kant’s mental powers after 1796. Kant has ceased to think, but continues to live — 
however miserably. I doubt that any reader who has followed Kuehn this far will be able 
to stop reading: against all odds, we find ourselves, at the end, caring very much about 
Kant’s fading life and the image of the now-befuddled sage of Königsberg waiting 
expectantly for one of the few pleasures left him — the return of a titmouse to his garden  
(418)— is unforgettable. 
Kant emerges from these pages as a man of the eighteenth century — interested in 
recent scientific achievements, curious about the new worlds that were documented in 
traveler’s accounts, engrossed by political events, and fearless in his willingness to trace 
the moral and religious implications of his thought to conclusions that clearly troubled 
many of his contemporaries. Kuehn shows us a Kant who valued friendship and 
sociability, a man who — at least in the early years of his life — was (in the words of 
Hamann) “swept along by a whirlpool of societal diversions” (134).  For more than three 
decades, he took his meals at a pub (unless he was attending a dinner party) eating “in the 
company of men with very different backgrounds from his own, and he enjoyed it” (221).  
He never left his native Königsberg, though as Kuehn shows (55-60), Königsberg turns 
out to have been a fairly interesting place, far less provincial than Göttingen or Marburg, 
larger than most other university towns, and populated with enough Lithuanians, 
Huguenots, Mennonites, Poles, Russians, Jews, as well as Dutch and English merchants 
to allow Kuehn to characterize it as “multicultural” (59). It boasted a theater, where Kant 
and his friends attended plays by Voltaire, Molière, and Lessing and it had a number of 
reading societies, which Kant frequented in the 1760s (163-6). His teachers at the 
University of Königsberg were more diverse in their orientation than is sometimes 
realized. Carl Rappolt, a “declared enemy of Pietism” combined an allegiance to 
Christian Wolff’s philosophy with an interest in English philosophy and culture, while 
Martin Knutzen — though himself quite religiously orthodox —  was conversant with the 
work of English diests (76-81). Indeed, during the 1740s, Königsberg was alive with 
controversies surrounding the publications of the overtly Spinozist Christian Gabriel 
Fischer (81-82) and disputes over the religious implications (or lack thereof) of the comet 
of 1744 (83-4). The occupation of the town by Russian troops between 1758 and 1762 
only served to make Königsberg “a lively place,” as Russian officers filled the 
university’s classrooms and the town’s merchants grew rich supplying the army (112-
114).   
Kuehn offers an exhaustive account of the diverse friendships Kant cultivated. 
There are fine discussions of his peculiar relationship with Johann Georg Hamann— a 
relationship that seemed to thrive despite fundamental disagreements on just about  
everything of philosophical significance — and his friendship with his student, and later 
colleague, Christian Jacob Kraus, a man who was devoted to both Kant and Hamann. 
Kuehn places a special emphasis on the importance of the English merchant Joseph 
Green  in Kant’s development. Green was Kant’s closest friend and influenced 
everything from Kant’s fabled punctuality (Kuehn suggests that if Königsbergers indeed 
could set their clocks by Kant’s perambulations, it was chiefly because of Green’s own 
obsessive punctuality forced Kant to keep to a more regular schedule [154-156]) to the 
writing of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant presented every sentence of the book to 
Green for his approval, and as Kuehn observes, the book is peppered with “the language 
of merchants” [240-241]). Kant’s withdrawal from society began only with Green’s death 
in 1786 — for the rest of his life, he refrained from leaving his home in the evenings, 
preferring to remain alone during the hours that he had previously spent with Green 
(322). 
What is perhaps most impressive about this study is the ease with which Kuehn 
(also the author of an insightful book on the impact of Scottish philosophy in Germany) 
moves between Kant’s life and his thought. The discussion of the development of Kant’s 
mature philosophy is unfailingly lucid, clarifying what precisely it was about Hume’s 
work that spurred Kant down the path that led to the Critique of Pure Reason (198-201, 
472-3). The ten-page précis of the book’s argument (240-250) is deft and masterful. 
Kuehn never loses sight of the moral and religious concerns that animated Kant’s critical 
philosophy and emphasizes that Kant’s insistence that “we cannot know what is beyond 
experience” does not mean that we are relieved of the task of trying to “think” it (see the 
fine discussion of the difference between “boundaries [Grenzen]” and “limits 
[Schranken]” on 261-2). According to Kuehn, Kant sought to show “that even in the 
absence of knowledge of absolute reality, morality has a claim on us that is itself absolute 
and incontrovertible. It is this moral claim on us that elevates us above the beasts” (265). 
The concern with moral questions reach far back into Kant’s life and, in what is perhaps 
the book’s most audacious claim, Kuehn argues that the origins of Kant’s perspective on 
morality can be traced back to a reorientation in his own life that took place around the 
time of his fortieth birthday (1764). Drawing on Kant’s notes and lectures on 
anthropology, Kuehn offers a strikingly different picture of Kant’s ethical theory that 
gives pride of place to the concept of “character” (144-151). “Character,” Kuehn argues, 
“is built on maxims,” those precepts which, as any reader of Kant’s mature moral 
philosophy knows, must be tested by the categorical imperative.  But by the time Kant 
got around to writing his mature moral philosophy, discussions of reason, the categorical 
imperative, and duty tended to crowd out any sustained discussion of the relationship of 
maxims and character, thus leaving readers with the impression “that character did not 
seem to be as important to him as it really is” (204). To live by maxims, in Kuehn’s 
account of Kant’s understanding of morality, “is to live in a principled way, is to live 
rationally;” they prevent us from “being swept away by emotions and thus acting 
foolishly” (145-6). As the “most basic rules of conduct and thinking” they are relatively 
few in number and their adoption “should be viewed as a rare and very important event in 
a human life,” marking a change in what Kant terms one’s Denkungsart  — a “way of 
thinking” — as opposed to one’s Sinnesart (“way of sensing”). 
 
*** 
The importance of this complex of concepts for Kant’s moral philosophy is the 
central theme of G. Felicitas Munzel’s Kant’s Conception of Moral Character, which 
shares with Kuehn’s biography the remarkable ability to force readers to realize that there 
are entire dimensions of Kant’s thought that everyone else appears to have missed. If 
recent critics of Kant have faulted him for an obsession with rules and a neglect of 
notions such as character or virtue, the problem may lie in the failure to recognize the 
crucial role played by the concept of Denkungsart in Kant’s work. The term, as Munzel 
shows (39-43), is everywhere in Kant, though existing English translations have managed 
to conceal this fact by failing to come up with a consistent way of translating it: for 
instance, Norman Kemp Smith’s classic translation of the Critique of Pure Reason 
renders it variously as “thought,” “way of thinking,” “manner of thinking,” “modes of 
thought,” and translates the crucial phrase “revolution of Denkungsart” as “intellectual 
revolution,” “revolution in point of view,” and “changed point of view” (Munzel xv-xvi). 
With this much noise in the translation, it is little wonder that Kant’s message has been 
garbled. Fortunately, the Cambridge Edition includes the term in their glossary and 
proposes “way of thinking” as a translation. Munzel proposes “conduct of thought,” 
arguing that Kant used the term to designate “an activity of thought informed by certain 
principles” (xvi).  
The concept spans Kant’s theoretical and practical writings: the famous 
“Copernican Revolution” in the Critique of Pure Reason (B xxii) is, in fact, a shift in our 
Denkungsart while the “maxims of understanding” outlined in the Critique of Judgment 
§40 (pace the Cambridge Edition, it is unlikely that we are likely to be seeing scholars 
refer to this work as the Critique of the Power of Judgment) are rules for our “conduct of 
thought.” To follow the third of these maxims and think in a way which is consistent is, 
in Munzel’s account, to adopt that “resolute Denkungsart” which makes human beings 
capable of morality. To live a life that is organized around principles (or, in Kant’s terms, 
to follow maxims) is to have effected a change in one’s Denkungsart — or, more 
precisely, it is to live the sort of life that could be said to be guided by thought. Munzel 
traces the emergence of this particular constellation of Denkungsart and “character” to 
the period prior to the writing of the Critique of Pure Reason and suggests that its 
emergence may be related to the “great light of 1769” (49) — Kant’s characterization of 
the crucial insight that inaugurated his recasting of his approach to philosophy and which 
culminated in the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason. This lends support to the 
emphasis in Kuehn and other scholars (notably Dieter Henrich and Richard Velkley) on 
primacy of moral concerns in the development of Kant’s critical philosophy. 
Munzel’s book could also be seen as a contribution to the growing literature that 
has emphasized the importance of Kant’s lectures on anthropology (some of which were 
eventually collected and published in 1797 as Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View). The Groundwork of a Metaphysic of Morals famously sought to “work out for 
once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only 
empirical and that belongs only to anthropology” (Practical Philosophy 44). Yet, as 
Munzel stresses, in his actual pedagogical practice, Kant was at pains to maintain lines of 
communication between ethics and anthropology. Whenever he lectured on ethics, he 
also offered a course on anthropology, and surviving student notes indicate that Kant 
made efforts to ensure that the two classes did not contradict one another. The notes from 
the 1784-1785 lectures on ethics were emphatic on this point: “morality cannot exist 
without anthropology” (Lectures on Ethics 42). It is a daunting task to trace the ways in 
which the two disciplines are interconnected in Kant, but Munzel does a brilliant job of 
exploring the connection. The concept of Denkungsart provides the key for unraveling 
the connections that link Kant’s moral philosophy, his anthropology, his discussions of 
education, his account of aesthetic judgment, and his reflections on history. Other 
scholars have succeeded in tracing certain of these threads, but few have been able to find 
the means to demonstrate the deep connections between these seemingly disparate topics. 
The resolution to adopt a life that is informed by a Denkungsart marks, for Kant, 
“a ‘kind of rebirth,’ a ‘transformation’ whose moment of occurrence marks a ‘new epoch’ 
in the life of an individual” (160). To live such a life is to have moved beyond a life 
governed merely by a “Sinnesart” (“sensibility”). Munzel cites a particularly succinct 
passage from Kant’s notebooks: “To make maxims for oneself: Denkungsart. Otherwise, 
Sinnesart” (56). The bulk of the literature on Kant’s moral philosophy has been 
concerned, perhaps understandably, with the categorical imperative and the host of 
questions that Kant’s discussions of it raise. While it is generally recognized that the 
function of the categorical imperative is to test maxims, there has not been a great deal of 
attention to the question of how it is that moral agents come to have maxims available for 
testing in the first place. Certainly the Groundwork provides readers with little guidance: 
in the discussion of duty in first section of the book Kant simply assumes that subjects 
have them (see Practical Philosophy 55), but he only gets around to explaining what a 
maxim in a not particularly illuminating footnote in the second section that defines it as a 
“subjective principle of acting” which must “be distinguished from the objective 
principle, namely the practical law” (Practical Philosophy 73). To make matters worse, 
the footnote goes on to associate maxims with the subject’s “inclinations,” which may 
mislead readers into assuming that any individual whim, if formulated with a sufficient 
degree of generality (e.g., “always try the local beer”) could pass muster as a maxim. By 
exploring the ways in which Kant handles the relationship between maxims, 
Denkungsart, and moral character in his writings on anthropology, Munzel lets us see 
that things are not this simple. The fashioning of maxims, indeed, the very decision to 
live a life that is governed by consciously formulated principles, already involves 
questions of considerable moral significance. Hence, discussions of Kant’s moral 
philosophy that focus primarily on the so-called “Categorical Imperative Procedure” are 
missing a good part of the story. One might think of the categorical imperative as a moral 
equivalent of a grammar checker, analyzing moral rules to make sure that they do not 
violate what, for Kant, is the essential requirement of moral statements: their potential 
universalizability. But a study of Kant’s moral philosophy that concerned itself only with 
universalization tests would be as impoverished as a theory of poetics that confined itself 
to the study of grammar.  
Munzel’s scholarship is formidable. Her command of the literature on Kant is 
impressive and her footnotes are a treasure-trove of insights into the state of the current 
debate on any number of central issues. She is sensitive to the nuances of Kant’s 
terminology: see, for example, her insightful discussion (279-288) of Kant’s distinction 
between Cultur, Erziehung (education), and Bildung (that untranslatable term that can 
mean either education, culture, or formation). Her examination of Kant’s account of 
moral character ranges easily across the terrain of moral philosophy, aesthetic theory, 
pedagogical theory, theology, and political theory — and, in the process, has written a 
book that will be essential reading for scholars in all these fields and a number of others. 
Among its many other virtues, Munzel’s book makes a compelling case against those 
critics of Kant’s moral philosophy who have charged that his ethical “formalism” 
exemplified “all that is wrong with the Enlightenment” by “failing to provide an account 
of character and its formation in moral and political life” (1). She helps us to see that such 
a picture of what Kant was about rests on an understanding of Kant’s moral philosophy 
that fails to venture much beyond the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. 
 
*** 
If Munzel’s book can be seen, in part, as a response to critics of Kant’s moral 
philosophy, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Karl Amerik’s provocative study of the 
reception and appropriation of Kant’s critical philosophy by Karl Leonhard Reinhold, 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, speaks to another group of 
Kant’s more recent critics: those who view his philosophy as yet another botched 
exercise in metaphysical  “foundationalism.” Their misunderstandings about Kant turn 
out to have a rather complex provenance. 
While present day critics of Kant’s philosophy typically see it as “one more 
desperate attempt to construct a modern pseudo-object, a literally fabricated 
philosopher’s world, lying in an unneeded nowhere land between the informalities of 
common life and the strict claims of science itself” (55), the first generation of Kant’s 
readers were perturbed by its lack of systematicity. They charged that it “exacerbated 
rather than alleviated the challenge of skepticism” and they charged that it “divided the 
world, the self, and philosophy into untenable strict dualisms” (56) — hence the myriad 
of systems that arose in German philosophy in the wake of Kant’s critical philosophy, 
each of them claiming to have perfected and completed Kant’s project. Kant was rather 
ill-disposed towards these efforts — witness his public letter disavowing any connection 
between his own philosophy and Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, a letter in which Kant 
offered what he claimed was an old Italian proverb: “May God protect us especially from 
our friends, for we shall manage to watch out for our enemies ourselves” 
(Correspondence 559-560). Ameriks agrees: the alleged “friends” of Kant’s philosophy 
represent, in his view, “the greatest danger to it” (5). In a wide-ranging study, he outlines 
the ways in which a series of “friends” of the Kantian system proceeded to develop 
responses to what they saw as its central problems and, in the end, provided answers that 
were “usually much worse than whatever Kant himself had to offer” (19). Far from being 
simply a historical curiosity, it is his claim that these misunderstandings of what Kant 
was about persist to this day and that, as a result, Kant’s own project remains obscured 
beneath the wreckage of the various efforts that have been made at perfecting it. 
As this sketch suggests, Ameriks has advanced a decidedly ambitious argument: if 
he is right, most of what has been written about Kant — from the earliest commentaries 
to the more recent work, both by those who have sought to remain true to Kant’s original 
project (dubbed by Ameriks “pure Kantians”) and those who have sought to advance 
beyond him (the so-called “post-Kantians”) — has misunderstood him. As a result, Kant 
and Fate of Autonomy is even more ambitious than its subtitle would have us believe: 
before tracing how Kant’s first readers misunderstood him, Ameriks has to sketch what 
he maintains Kant was actually attempting to do. Hence, the first part of the book is 
devoted to sketching the broad outlines of Kant’s system, a system that Ameriks argues is 
“remarkably modest and sophisticated in its conception of the systematic nature of 
philosophy ….” (37-8). It is also, in Ameriks’ view, as system that remained, in one 
important sense, incomplete (50). In an 1787 letter to his disciple Ludwig Heinrich Jakob, 
Kant expressed the hope that, once he completed the “critical” part of his system, he 
could move on to the “dogmatic” (or “doctrinal”) part. But since he was currently at work 
on what would eventually become the Critique of Judgment, he encouraged Jakob to 
work up “a short system of metaphysics for the time being,” noting “I don’t have time to 
propose a design for it right now” (Correspondence 262-3). Nor, Ameriks observes, did 
Kant ever find the time to complete the metaphysics whose sketch he had sought to 
subcontract out to Jakob. For the rest of his life, he lectured regularly on metaphysics — 
basing his lectures on the same text he had recommended to Jakob: Baumgarten’s 
Metaphysics. But while the subject was, as Ameriks notes, “his favorite” and constituted 
“the compendium of theoretical philosophy as such,” he never produced the promised 
“system of metaphysics” (50). The notion that Kant should be concerned with 
metaphysics at all — and with a system like Baumgarten’s in particular — runs counter 
to views of both present-day “post Kantians” and “pure Kantians” both of whom tend to 
see metaphysics as “a weak and dying discipline” (11).   
Ameriks argues that the success of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton in outlining 
mathematical “systems of the world” provided both a spur towards a greater concern with 
rigorous systematicity  (by providing a paradigm for what a systematic account should 
look like) and towards a growing suspicion that metaphysics was of little real 
significance (since all it could do, even if successful, would be “to duplicate things with 
special philosophical furniture” [52-53]). In this account, the one area where philosophy 
might have a role to play would be in sorting out the fate of everything that could not be 
fitted into the new scientific world system, including not only the central concerns of 
“religion, ethics, and scholastic philosophy, but also of elementary common sense and the 
whole range of notions developed in long-standing and prestigious disciplines that were 
not organized like the new fundamental and quantitative sciences” (53). Ameriks’ 
account of Kant’s response to this situation centers on two related issues: the relationship 
between our ordinary understanding of the world and the perception of the world posited 
by modern science and the question of the place of freedom in a world that, as modern 
science presents it, is ruled by a system of causal mechanisms. He sees Kant’s response 
as quite “modest.”  Rather than seeking some sort of “privileged sphere” or set of 
“foundational representations” that could serve as the unique concern of a revised 
metaphysics, Kant’s system offered little in the way of foundations but instead was quite 
content to work out the relationship between our “ordinary empirical judgment and 
theoretical science” (43-45). In the process he laid out a set of “fairly substantive but very 
limited metaphysical claims about our rational essence as practical and theoretical 
beings” (17). What Ameriks views as an admirably modest and, indeed, still quite 
promising approach to metaphysics struck at least some of its first readers as both 
insufficient (because it failed to offer a definitive refutation of the philosophical 
skepticism that had emerged as one possible response to the new scientific world-view), 
unsystematic (since Kant had rejected the idea of starting out from a privileged 
foundation), and too traditional in its metaphysical commitments (his writings on religion 
left too much room for notions like immortality, God, and radical evil). 
The relatively unknown German philosophy Karl Leonhard Reinhold looms large 
in Ameriks’ account of how Kant’s “modest” metaphysics was quickly supplanted by a 
series of the ever more ambitious philosophical systems associated with such more 
familiar figures as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. As the leading contemporary explicator 
of Kant’s system, Reinhold had a decisive influence on the way in which Kant was 
understood in the last two decades of the eighteenth century. In Ameriks’ view, however, 
Reinhold’s influence reaches beyond the 1780s and, indeed, continues down to our own 
day. When present-day historians of philosophy such as Frederick Beiser argue that 
“unless philosophy after Kant could be given a genuine foundation in an absolutely 
certain and scientific sense, reason itself would be undermined” or when present-day 
critics of the Kantian legacy such as Richard Rorty argue that Kant’s philosophy was 
“marked by a confused obsession with representationalism and the project of securing for 
philosophy a strict scientific status of its own,” they are, without realizing it, reading 
Kant more or less as Reinhold read him (89-90). And, in Ameriks’ view, this is to read 
Kant wrong. 
Reinhold had come to Weimar from Vienna, where —his youthful desire to enter 
the priesthood thwarted by the dissolution of the Jesuits  — he drifted into the Masonic 
movement and became a critic of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. A vigorous champion of 
the enlightenment ideals (he was befriended by Christoph Martin Wieland and was a 
regular contributor to the Teutscher Merkur), he thought he had found in Kant’s critical 
philosophy an approach that was simultaneously “public” (i.e., capable of being widely 
disseminated to a population awaiting enlightenment), “professional” (i.e., rigorously 
philosophical unlike the more literary form of “popular philosophy” that had dominated 
German public discussion in during the latter half of the eighteenth century), strictly 
“bounded” to a consideration only of what was given in experience (hence free of the 
transcendent entities that populated traditional metaphysical systems), and as committed 
to the fundamental “autonomy” of the individual (which, among other things, meant that 
he saw Kant’s system as concerned, above all else, with moral questions). While this may 
appear to be a plausible summary of Kant’s philosophy, it is Ameriks’ conviction that 
such an impression only testifies to the degree to which we have become Reinholdians 
without knowing it: on each of these points, Reinhold has altered Kant’s approach. 
Ameriks’ sees Reinhold’s central innovation as residing in what Ameriks terms 
the “short argument” to idealism. In place of the complex and (for Reinhold and 
especially for those who followed him) unsystematic set of considerations which make up 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Reinhold proposed an approach which he regarded as 
both simpler and more rigorous. He argued that Kant had simply presupposed the notion 
of “representation [Vorstellung]” without actually analyzing it. By proceeding from the 
“fact of consciousness” and breaking the concept of representation down into its 
component parts, it would be possible to provide an alternative presentation that — at 
least in Reinhold’s eyes — remained true to the spirit, if not always the letter, of Kant’s 
system (namely, that it be “public,” “professional,” “bounded,” and “autonomous”). 
Ameriks, however, sees a number of problems with the “short argument,” beginning with 
the fact that, prior to Reinhold’s elaboration of the argument Kant had expressed 
misgivings towards approaches of this sort (104). Further, the approach had the 
consequence of barring the way to the “modest” metaphysics that Ameriks sees as central 
to Kant’s entire project. Reinhold held that, because the “thing in itself” was 
“unrepresentable,” it was “unknowable” (127). With this interpretation, philosophy was 
given a clearly bounded domain to explore, secure from interference by other disciplines. 
But Kant insisted that while things in themselves could not be known, they can 
nevertheless be thought — and it was, for him, the business of metaphysics to attempt to 
think such things (143).  
While Reinhold himself would later back away from some of the implications of 
the short argument— in part because of objections from his students at Jena, some of 
whom (such as Friedrich von Hardenberg [“Novalis”] and Friedrich Niethammer) would 
later play a significant role in early romanticism —  Fichte constructed a philosophical 
system that, as Ameriks demonstrates, was even more emphatic in its attempt to ground 
everything on a single principle. And Hegel, despite his critique of many aspects of 
Fichte’s system, still wound up viewing Kant through the lenses that Fichte had borrowed 
from Reinhold. In these later refinements of Reinhold’s approach, Ameriks suggests that 
much of the practical impetus behind the “short argument” has been lost. For Reinhold, 
the “short argument” held out the promise of providing a surer means to enlighten a 
public. But as the next generation of German idealists began to explore the intricacies of 
consciousness and representation, the linkage to efforts at enlightenment began to loosen. 
In a memorable passage, Ameriks observes, “One gets the image of a magnificent 
eighteenth-century sailing ship out on a voyage where the crew has become fascinated 
simply by the rigging and has lost all sight, interest, and hope of reaching the original 
goal of being the philosopher kings of the modern era” (111). 
Kant and the Fate of Autonomy can be, at times, a rather daunting book. There is 
a fair amount of repetition and backtracking, though — given the difficulties of the point 
Ameriks is making and the pervasiveness of the misunderstandings he seeks to remedy 
— these periodic restatements of his thesis are welcome. The book also faces the 
challenge of addressing two rather different bodies of literature: the ever-increasing 
number of studies (many in German) documenting the historical development of Kant’s 
philosophy and the enormous number of recent commentaries on the works of Kant, 
Fichte, and Hegel. Ameriks has a staggering command of scholarship in both of these 
areas and his nimbleness in moving from one part of the literature to another is 
impressive (consider, for instance the discussion of the implications of Fichte’s “practical 
turn” in which  — in the space of two pages [217-218] — Ameriks effortlessly moves 
from Kant and Fichte to the famous disputation between Cassirer and Heidegger at 
Davos, offers some passing comments on unexpected commonalities between such 
continental theorists as Foucault, Derrida, and Habermas and American such as Quine, 
Chisholm, and Rawls, before settling into a brief discussion of the work of Wilfrid 
Sellars). But what is perhaps most challenging about Ameriks’ study is that, even more 
than in the case of Munzel’s book, one comes away from it with the sense that Kant is a 
rather different thinker than has been assumed. 
Given the thoroughness with which he has made his case, it is hard to disagree 
with him. Certainly, there are few scholars working today who have as complete a 
mastery of Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, which pay a pivotal role in his argument. 
Nevertheless, the idea that everyone, from Reinhold onward, misread Kant tends to 
prompt some understandable skepticism. As presented by Ameriks, Kant’s “modest 
metaphysics” would seem to be a rather attractive philosophical position, indeed — as he 
concludes — it may do a far better job than any other available philosophy of working 
about a reconciliation between the claims of science (and the challenge that it poses to the 
notion of a free will) and the requirements of morality, which seems to require some 
conception of human autonomy (341-3). But how could such an attractive option have 
been ignored for so long? Was Kant so singularly incompetent in his mode of 
presentation that it has taken us two centuries to get his point? Ameriks offers, in passing, 
a tantalizing indication that perhaps Kant’s message was not entirely overlooked. Even as 
Reinhold was popularizing an approach that, in Ameriks’ view, obscured the true content 
of Kant’s philosophy, there seems to have been a small circle of scholars at Jena, 
including Friedrich Niethammer, Johann Benjamin Erhard, and Franz von Herbert, who 
recognized that Reinhold was getting Kant wrong (64-66). This suggests that there is 
another history to be written, perhaps be even more complex than the one traced here, 
which would explore the impact of these thinkers (whose work is even less known than 
that of Reinhold) on Jena romanticism and beyond. Thanks to the work of Dieter Henrich 
and Manfred Frank, we are beginning to learn something about this history, but certainly 
further contributions by Ameriks on these questions would be welcome.  
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